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"TERMINATOR 21/2": THE CONSTITUTION 
IN AN ALTERNATE WORLD 
Daniel A. Farber* 
[The computer] was so certain that time displacement could save it 
from defeat that it had sent two terminators through: one in 1984, 
and one now. . . . Remove two human beings like pieces out of a 
puzzle, hoping the new historical pattern that emerged after will be 
more in its favor. Editing the past to change its present. 
Randall Frakes, Terminator 2: 
Judgment Day 1561 
LEITER FROM THOMAS JEFFERSON TO JOHN ADAMS, 
JULY 2, 1826 
... As the End approaches, old friend, I cannot help but reflect 
on the mysterious Death of mister Madison. In the years that have 
gone by since that day, I have collected and assayed the testimony 
of many of the Witnesses. There was much Confusion. Several 
speake of a Man all dressed in leather and with Dark eye glasses of 
a forbidding aspect. Others claim to have seen feats of amazing 
Strengthe, and say that he did lift a horse to clear a path to our 
Friend. Yet Men are prone to imagine Horrors and among those 
who live in Cities the tendency to alarms and panic is great indeed. 
All that we can know for fact is that a man jumped from the crowd 
and fired many bullets into the helpless figure of our Friend. 
Thus was his corporeal existence Terminated. How or why 
will never be knowne. Little wonder that Congress soon removed 
itself from the dangers and Crimes of New York to a safer seat of 
Government. 
• Henry J. Fletcher Professor of Law, University of Minnesota. Thanks are due to 
Dianne Farber, Phil Frickey, Mike Paulsen, and Suzanna Sherry for helpful comments. 
Non-historians should note that certain bill of attainder cases-Garland, Missouri v. 
Cummings, and United States v. Brown-are described or quoted in the text without any 
modification of the "real" versions. The same is true of Chisholm v. Georgia and of the 
description of ante-bellum views of the Privileges and Immunities Clause. 
This article is dedicated to the post-contemporary philosopher Jean-Luc Picard. 
I. Bantam Books, 1991. 
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Poor Jemmy! If only he had lived. How History would have 
been different we cannot know in Detail but we cannot doubt. 
• • • • • • • • • • • • 
ANNALS OF CONGRESS, JUNE 8, 1789 
THE SPEAKER addressed the House concerning the death of 
the Honorable Representative from Virginia, Mr. James Madison. 
MR. SHERMAN We must all mourn the passing of one of the 
first Architects of our Nation. His role in the construction of our 
constitution is known to all present. We must carry on in the spirit 
in which he set forth. 
If Mr. Madison had lived, he planned today to request that the 
House go into a Committee of the Whole to consider amendments 
to that document, or that a select Committee be appointed to con-
sider the Matter. As he was wont to say, such amendments may on 
the whole have a salutary effect, and he was of the view that it 
would be highly political and proper in itself for the tranquility of 
the public mind that we should offer some such protections to be 
incorporated into the system of government. He had written a brief 
draft of these amendments, which I have brought with me today for 
the purpose of moving that the House refer them to the Committee 
of the Whole. 
ELBRIDGE GERRY With the greatest of respect to the late 
Member, urgent business faces this House regarding the revenues 
and government of the United States. In the original drafting of the 
Constitution Mr. Madison built better than perhaps even he knew, 
and to amend the building in haste is no fit tribute to the original 
architect who designed the plans. I move that the main motion be 
laid upon the table. 
Upon a taking of the ayes and nays, the ayes had it, and the 
motion was laid upon the table: 
• • • • • • • • • • • • 
DANIEL FARBER & SUZANNA SHERRY, A META-HISTORY OF 
THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION (1990), pp. 230-231. 
Madison's death was a turning point. His bereft widow, lack-
ing other resources, opened a bakery with the assistance of friends, 
and became famous as the creator of the confections for children 
that are known by her name even today. Spurred on by popular 
revulsion at his death, the Jeffersonians were successful in organiz-
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ing a new party, and seized power from the Federalists in the Presi-
dential election of 1801. 
With the fateful death of Madison, the one real opportunity for 
a national bill of rights passed. The Federalists remained uncon-
vinced of its necessity, insisting as they always had that the limited 
powers of the new government would not extend to the violation of 
individual rights. For the Anti-Federalists, the demand for a bill of 
rights had never been much more than a makeweight. Perhaps, if 
Madison had lived, he would have felt bound by his own promises 
to promote the passage of a bill of rights. Ironically, his death made 
a bill of rights less likely than ever. Many assumed that his un-
known assailant was an embittered opponent of the Constitution. 
In the aftermath of his mysterious death, Madison became known 
as the "Martyr of the Constitution." Any change in the original 
document-which was often referred to as "our Perfect Constitu-
tion" -was subject to popular attack as an affront to the memory of 
the Martyr. 
As the years went by, and the Constitution remained un-
amended, the very idea of amending the Constitution became more 
and more unthinkable. When the Supreme Court shocked the na-
tion in Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419 (1793), by holding 
that an individual could sue a state in federal court, there was much 
muttering about a constitutional amendment, but there was even 
greater support for impeachment of the Justices. The Court hastily 
granted rehearing and overruled its prior decision. The one aspect 
of Chisholm to have permanent effect was its reliance on the Pream-
ble (2 Dall. at 464, 474-76), which might otherwise have been dis-
missed as "window dressing." 
Even in the aftermath of the Civil War, the few amendments 
proposed by Radical Republicans were unsuccessful. A proposed 
amendment to abolish slavery foundered, as Congress preferred to 
rely on the War Power and Guarantee clauses of the Constitution as 
the basis for reconstructing the South. The majority of Republicans 
believed amendments to be unnecessary. They agreed with Senator 
Trumbull that the Privileges and Immunities clause of Article IV 
already established that "the rights of a citizen of the United States 
were certain great fundamental rights, such as the right to life, to 
liberty, and to avail one's self of all the laws passed for the benefit of 
the citizen to enable him to enforce his rights." Cong. Globe, 39th 
Cong., 1st Sess. 600 (1866). 
If Madison had lived, things might have been very different. 
As it is, to this day, the document stands just as it did at the end of 
the summer of 1787. 
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JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE 
UNITED STATES (1820) 
Article III of the Constitution, section 2, paragraph 3, states 
that "The Trial of all Crimes, except in Cases of Impeachment, 
shall be by Jury." To the uneducated sense of the lay person, this 
might seem only a matter of procedure at Trial. But those who 
were responsible for its adoption understood it differently, as would 
all who know the sorry history of English state trials. What avails 
it to have a jury at the trial, if the whole matter be settled by a 
confession twisted from the unwilling defendant by torture or 
threat? The true trial would then take place, not before the jury, 
but in the dark interrogation room of the gaol. Even in the case of 
treason, the Framers in their wisdom required in Article III, section 
3, clause 1, that any conviction not grounded on the evidence of two 
witnesses be based on "Confession in Open Court," so as to guard 
against the destruction of the right to jury trial through secret inter-
rogation of the prisoner. In cases less grave, an out-of-court confes-
sion may be admitted, but only if made without coercion; otherwise, 
the right to jury trial would be negated. And so also, if the matter 
be settled by papers seized from the defendant without any proper 
cause, or if the defendant be denied the use of counsel with whom to 
address the jury, or the right to bring witnesses before the jury and 
to question those appearing against him, so that the jury is denied 
knowledge of his cause. True trial by jury means trial according to 
the accustomed course of common law, with the rights of procedure 
that have been the due process of our law. So it has been under-
stood since Magna Carta, and so it was understood by the founders 
of our Nation. For their solemn pledge was that the Constitution 
contained within it the rights of free citizens, so that the power of 
the government was limited by those inherent and inalienable 
rights. 
• • • • • • • • • • • • 
STRA UDER V. WEST VIRGINIA 
100 u.s. 303 (1880) 
[Strauder, a black defendant, was convicted of murder by a jury 
from which blacks were excluded under state law. The issue before 
the Court was the constitutionality of the state statute.] 
JUSTICE STRONG delivered the opinion of the Court. 
• • • 
The defendant argues that the statute removing members of 
the negro race from jurors is a bill of attainder. We are constrained 
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to agree. In Cummings v. Missouri, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 277 (1866), we 
held unconstitutional a state law that required priests to take an 
oath that they had never aided the late rebellion. The Court ex-
plained the scope of the clause: 
The deprivation of any rights, civil or political, previously en-
joyed, may be punishment, the circumstances attending and the 
causes of the deprivation determining this fact. Disqualification 
from office may be punishment, as in cases of convictions upon 
impeachment. Disqualification from the pursuits of a lawful avo-
cation, or from positions of trust, or from the privilege of appear-
ing in the courts, or acting as an executor, administrator, or 
guardian, may also, and often has been, imposed as punishment. 
71 U.S. at 320. 
In Ex parte Garland, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 333 (1866), we held that 
even Congress could not require a similar loyalty oath by attorneys 
practicing in the federal courts. We have no doubt that such an 
oath could never be required of jurors. If, then, it is clearly uncon-
stitutional to deprive a person by statute of fundamental rights on 
the basis of their past misconduct, how much more unconstitutional 
it must be where the basis of denial is not any conduct of their own, 
but only the circumstances of birth. 
The appellee argues that disabilities based on race cannot be 
bills of attainder since slavery was itself contemplated in the Consti-
tution. But slavery, when it existed, was based on the lack of citi-
zenship of the slaves. Lacking legal personhood, they could not 
enjoy the protection of the rights granted by the Constitution to 
others. Congress, in the exercise of its power in Article I, sec. 8, 
clause 4, to establish uniform laws of naturalization, has made citi-
zens of all those unfortunates who were formerly held as slaves. 
Having become citizens, they are now entitled to the full protection 
of the Constitution, and can no more be subjected to bills of attain-
der, ex post facto laws, or impairments of contract, than any other 
citizens. And those who were not slaves themselves but only chil-
dren of slaves must in the future have the full rights of citizens, of 
which not even Congress could deprive them, for under Article III, 
section 3, even conviction for Treason, let alone anything else, can 
not "work Corruption of Blood." All distinctions based on ances-
try are wholly repugnant to the Constitution, which bans not only 
punishment of the son for the sins of the father, but also elevation 
through any title of nobility. 
The legislature in this case has imposed a grave disability and 
stigma, not on those who have been adjudicated to have violated 
some previously enacted statute, but on a class singled out by the 
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legislature for disapproval. For the legislature to attaint an entire 
race is as much if not more a violation of the clause as for the legis-
lature to attaint a named individual or a group such as the support-
ers of the rebellion. This Court, which has defended even the rights 
of those who sought to overthrow the Constitution in the name of 
slavery, must stand steadfast against violations of the rights of those 
whom the late rebels sought to hold in chains. 
• • • • • • • • • • • • 
THOMAS COOLEY, A TREATISE ON THE CONSTITUTIONAL 
LIMITATIONS (1868), pp. 167-68. 
The protection of property being, as the Framers well under-
stood from their study of Locke, one of the foundations of legiti-
mate government, it cannot be thought that the right of property 
would be left unguarded by the Constitution. As the Dartmouth 
College case established, the Constitutional protection against im-
pairment of the obligation of contract is not limited to private debts, 
though that may have been the concern that originally prompted 
the drafting of the clause. Rather, the clause extends to all agree-
ments made by the states, whether in the form of agreements for the 
repayment of money, corporate charters, or grants of property. 
Common sense concurs that the clause cannot be limited to 
any particular legal form of undertaking by the state. It would be of 
little use to have a constitution that protected against a modification 
of the charter of Dartmouth College, if the state could have 
achieved the same goal by seizing all of the property of the college 
without compensation, and then remitting the property to a newly 
chartered corporation more agreeable to the legislature. Implicit in 
every grant of property by or under state law is the undertaking of 
the state to respect the ownership of that property. That undertak-
ing is, of course, subject to the police power where the use of prop-
erty would be contrary to the public health, welfare, or morals, and 
it leaves the state with the power to purchase the property over the 
owner's objections at fair market price. But whether or not the 
state has explicitly so stated, it can never be presumed to have re-
served the power to arbitrarily destroy property or eliminate its 
value. It is the office of the Contract Clause to protect that implicit 
understanding. 
As the great Chancellor Kent understood, legislation in civil 
society must be based on the twin principles deriving from the limits 
on the temporal jurisdiction of the legislature: First, that which was 
neither a crime nor a basis for culpability when the act was done 
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cannot be made so afterward; and second, property once lawfully 
gained cannot afterwards be arbitrarily denied. These fundamental 
principles need not be explicitly stated to remain valid, but the Con-
tract Clause is an implicit ratification of them. 
• • • • • • • • • • • • 
LOCHNER V. NEW YORK 
198 u.s. 45 (1905) 
[A New York statute prohibited the employment of bakery employ-
ees for more than 10 hours a day or 60 hours a week. The statute 
was attacked as a violation of the Contract Clause and the Privi-
leges and Immunities Clause of Article IV.] 
JUSTICE PECKHAM delivered the opinion of the Court. 
• • • 
The statute necessarily interferes with the right of contract be-
tween the employer and employees. As to all employment relation-
ships already in existence it relieves the employees of their 
obligation to perform the hours of service required by their con-
tract; we need not consider in the present case whether it also im-
pairs an implicit undertaking of the state to uphold the liberty of its 
citizens. As to even future employment relationships, it deprives 
the individual of one of the great "privileges and immunities of citi-
zens of the Several states." For that clause has long been under-
stood to encompass the fundamental rights of free citizens. In 
Cor:field v. Coryell, 6 Fed. Cas. 546, 551-52 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1823), 
Justice Washington said that this clause included "those privileges 
and immunities which are, in their nature, fundamental; which be-
long, of right, to the citizens of all free governments; and which 
have, at all times, been enjoyed by the citizens of the several states." 
Among those rights were "Protection by the government; the enjoy-
ment of life and liberty, with the right to acquire and possess prop-
erty of every kind, and to pursue and obtain happiness and safety; 
subject nevertheless to such restraints as the government may justly 
prescribe for the general good of the whole." The right to pursue a 
lawful occupation as one sees fit, and to enter into a contract with 
one's employer, is thus such a fundamental right. The question 
then, is whether the power of police described in that last clause 
provides a justification for the statute before us. 
[The Court held that the purported health justification for the 
statute was specious.] 
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GITLOW V. NEW YORK 
268 u.s. 652 (1925) 
[The defendant was convicted of criminal anarchy. The majority 
held that he was properly convicted, inasmuch as he had gone be-
yond abstract academic discussion of revolution and had advocated 
the overthrow of the government.] 
JusTICE HOLMES, dissenting. Mr. Justice Brandeis and I are of the 
opinion that this judgment should be reversed. The general princi-
ple of free speech, it seems to me, must be taken to be included in 
the privileges and immunities clause of Article IV, in view of the 
scope that has been given to the word "immunities" as used there. 
[Holmes here cited Lochner and Corfield.] Even as to the federal 
government, the Framers took care to cabin the national power to 
punish sedition. The Constitution allows Congress to punish trea-
son only if there are two witnesses to an overt act. That prohibition 
would be a nullity if anything less than a criminal attempt to over-
throw the government could be punished, for Congress could then 
call Treason by another name and define the offense as it chose. 
To rise beyond mere preparation to the level of a punishable 
attempt, an act must give rise to a clear and present danger of harm. 
••• If what I think the correct test is applied, it is manifest that 
there was no present danger of an attempt to overthrow the govern-
ment by force on the part of the admittedly small minority who 
shared the defendant's views. It is said that this manifesto was 
more than a theory, it was an incitement. Every idea is an incite-
ment. It offers itself for belief, and if believed it is acted on unless 
some other belief outweighs it or some failure of energy stifles the 
movement at its birth. The only difference between the expression 
of an opinion and an incitement in the narrower sense is the 
speaker's enthusiasm for the result. Eloquence may set fire to rea-
son. But whatever may be thought of the redundant discourse 
before us it had no chance of starting a present conflagration. 
• • • • • • • • • • • • 
EVERSON V. BOARD OF EDUCATION 
330 u.s. 1 (1947) 
[This case involved a state law providing free bus transportation for 
children at parochial schools.] 
JusTICE BLACK delivered the opinion of the Court. 
• • • 
A large proportion of the early settlers of this country came 
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here from Europe to escape the bondage of laws which compelled 
them to support and attend government-favored churches. The 
centuries immediately before and contemporaneous with the coloni-
zation of America had been filled with turmoil, civil strife, and per-
secutions, generated in large part by established sects determined to 
maintain their absolute political and religious supremacy. * * * 
These practices of the old world were transplanted to and be-
gan to thrive in the soil of the new America. * * * They became so 
commonplace as to shock the freedom-loving colonials into a feel-
ing of abhorrence. [Justice Black then discussed the controversy in 
Virginia in 1785-86, in which Jefferson and Madison led the fight 
for religious freedom, and Madison wrote his famous Remonstrance 
against the law.] 
This Court has previously recognized that the provisions of the 
Constitution, in the drafting and adoption of which Madison played 
such a leading role, were intended to provide the same protection 
against governmental intrusion as the Virginia statute. That is un-
doubtedly what the "martyr of the Constitution" meant by the 
"blessings of liberty" in the Preamble, and why all religious tests for 
office were forever banned in Article VI, section 3. The separation 
of church and state was also clearly a part of the "republican" form 
of government guaranteed the states, by Article IV, section 4. In 
previous cases, this Court has recognized that a republican govern-
ment is necessarily a non-theocratic government, and that such a 
government could neither establish a religion nor impair the free 
exercise of religion. 
The "republican form of government" clause means at least 
this: No state can set up a church. Nor can it pass laws which aid 
one religion, aid all religions, or prefer one religion over another. 
And what the states cannot do under that Clause, the federal gov-
ernment is also without power to do under Article I, for as the sup-
porters of the Constitution made clear, the enumerated powers of 
the government did not extend to regulation of the press or to the 
subject of religion. 
* * * * * * * * * * * * 
BROWN V. BOARD OF EDUCATION 
347 u.s. 483 (1954) 
[This opinion concerns four cases from Kansas, South Carolina, 
Virginia, and Delaware, in which school segregation laws had been 
challenged.] 
CHIEF JUSTICE WARREN delivered the opinion of the Court. 
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• • • 
In the first cases in this Court after the civil war construing the 
Bill of Attainder Clause, the Court interpreted it as proscribing all 
state-imposed discriminations against the Negro race. [The Court 
here cited Strauder.] The doctrine of "separate but equal" did not 
make its appearance in this Court until 1896 in Plessy v. Ferguson, 
involving not education but transportation. • • • 
In approaching this problem, we cannot turn the clock back to 
1789, when the Constitution was adopted, or even to 1896 when 
Plessy was written. We must consider public education in the light 
of its full development and its present place in American life 
throughout the Nation. Only in this way can it be determined if 
segregation in public schools imposes a bill of attainder on these 
plaintiffs. • • • 
We come then to the question presented: Does segregation of 
children in public schools solely on the basis of race ... deprive the 
children of the minority group of equal educational opportunities? 
We believe that it does. • • • To separate them from others of simi-
lar age and qualifications solely because of their race generates a 
feeling of inferiority as to their status in the community that may 
affect their hearts and minds in a way unlikely ever to be undone. 
Whatever may have been true when P/essy was decided, today it is 
clear that segregation imposes a disability and a stigma on the af-
fected class, and therefore violates the constitutional prohibition on 
state bills of attainder. 
(In a companion case, Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954), 
the Court held that segregation within the District of Columbia vio-
lated the bill of attainder clause of Article I, section 9, which applies 
to the federal government rather than the states.] 
• • • • • • • • • • • • 
DANIEL FARBER & SUZANNA SHERRY, A META-HISTORY OF 
THE AMERICAN CoNSTITUTION (1990), pp. 256-57. 
The climax of economic libertarianism occurred in the early 
1930s, when the Court struck down important New Deal legisla-
tion. President Roosevelt then proposed to "pack" the Court with 
additional appointees. Although his proposal was rejected by Con-
gress, his view of the Constitution triumphed, first because of a 
switch in the views of a key justice and then because of new ap-
pointments. As a result, for many years the Court almost entirely 
withdrew from judicial review of economic regulations. It also left 
Congress free to regulate areas previously left to the States. In the 
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famous footnote 4 of Carolene Products, the Court drew a distinc-
tion between ordinary legislation and that contravening the rights 
of "discrete and insular" minorities, violating specific constitutional 
guarantees, or impairing the democratic process. That distinction 
was to prove fruitful in the years ahead. 
Gradually, the Court began to assume a new role as the guard-
ian of other individual rights, especially as against state govern-
ments. As early as the case of Palko v. Connecticut, the Court had 
held that the privileges and immunities clause incorporated those 
rights inherent in ordered liberty, relying in part on the intent of the 
Framers to "establish Justice," in the words of the Preamble. How-
ever, the Court rejected Justice Black's argument that specific pro-
tections-such as the Article III right to jury trial-were 
"incorporated" or "transplanted" into the Privileges and Immuni-
ties Clause of Article IV. 
Justice Black was never successful in selling his view of total 
transplantation, but the Warren Court held that the jury trial right 
was itself fundamental. This set the stage for the "transplantation" 
doctrine, under which various decisions construing the federal right 
to a jury trial were transplanted as interpretations of the Privileges 
and Immunities Clause of Article IV. Those rights included all of 
the various non-adversarial, inquisitorial methods of proof such as 
coerc-ed confessions (construed broadly in Miranda v. Arizona to in-
clude any confession unaccompanied by specified warnings), unrea-
sonable searches (a violation of the jury trial right under Mapp v. 
Ohio), and the assistance of counsel, at government expense if nec-
essary (Gideon v. Wainwright). 
Carolene Products, with its emphasis on freeing the channels of 
majority rule, naturally called to mind the mandate of the Guaran-
tee Clause. Early decisions by the Stone Court made it clear that 
the obligation of "the United States" to "guarantee to every State in 
this Union a Republican Form of Government" was binding on the 
Courts as well as on the political branches. Only as to the question 
of identifying the legitimate state government, which had early on 
been held to be a political question, were the courts powerless. 
In a series of cases involving the State of Texas, the Court 
made it clear that disenfranchisement of racial groups was incom-
patible with "our society's evolving view of the nature of republican 
government." In the capstone of these cases, the so-called Jaybirds 
Case, the Court held that a de facto delegation of electoral power to 
a private group did not constitute a republican form of government. 
The Warren Court made even more expansive use of the 
clause. In the famous one-person, one-vote decisions, it held that 
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malapportionment was unrepublican and therefore unconstitu-
tional. It upheld the Voting Rights Act of 1965 and subsequent 
amendments as Congressional implementations of the clause. 
Building on the Holmes and Brandeis dissents of an earlier era, 
the Warren Court also aggressively protected freedom of expres-
sion. As Justice Cardozo once said, this freedom is as much "in-
stinct within the entire document" as found in any particular 
provision. Caro/ene Products made clear that free expression on 
political matters is inherent in the scheme of democratic majority 
rule established by the Constitution, which could hardly function if 
the public were unable to discuss political matters. 
Other provisions of the Constitution have also been invoked in 
support of free speech. For example, as early as Near v. Minnesota, 
the Court held that a prior restraint on speech violated the right to 
jury trial found in Article III and transplanted by the Privileges and 
Immunities Clause of Article IV. Historically, one key function of 
jury trials was to protect dissenters, and that function would be crit-
ically undermined if courts were allowed to use their equitable pow-
ers to suppress speech. 
The Privileges and Immunities Clause--once characterized by 
Justice Holmes as "the last resort of constitutional argument" -has 
also been utilized to protect freedom of speech. In United States v. 
Brown, 381 U.S. 437 (1965), the Court struck down a statute mak-
ing it a crime for a member of the Communist Party to be a labor 
union officer. Chief Justice Warren's opinion remains today as a 
leading discussion of the Bill of Attainder Clause. Rejecting the 
argument that the statute was not a bill of attainder because it af-
fected so large a group, the Court said "the decisions of this Court, 
as well as the historical background of the Bill of Attainder Clause, 
make it crystal clear that these are distinctions without a differ-
ence." Quoting Alexander Hamilton, the Court said: 
Nothing is more common than for a free people, in times of heat 
and violence, to gratify momentary passions, by letting into the 
government principles and precedents which afterwards prove 
fatal to themselves .... If the legislature can disenfranchise any 
number of citizens at pleasure by general descriptions, it may 
soon confine all the votes to a small number of partisans, and 
establish an aristocracy or oligarachy; if it may banish at discre-
tion all those whom particular circumstances render obnoxious, 
without hearing or trial, no man can be safe, nor know when he 
may be the innocent victim of a prevailing faction. The name of 
liberty applied to such a government, would be a mockery of 
common sense. [381 U.S. at 444]. 
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Thus, the Court said, "the Bill of Attainder Clause reflected the 
Framers' belief that the Legislative Branch is not so well suited as 
politically independent judges and juries to the task of ruling on the 
blameworthiness of . . . specific persons." 
Recently, conservatives have attacked many of these decisions 
as unwarrantedly "creative" readings of the Constitutional text. In 
response, some liberals have invoked the idea of a "living Constitu-
tion," arguing that since amending the Constitution has proved 
completely impossible, only judicial creativity can keep the Consti-
tution in tune with changing times. Other liberals rely on the origi-
nal intent of the Framers. The Federalists made it clear, they argue, 
that no bill of rights was required because the federal power lacked 
the power to invade fundamental individual rights. Thus, even 
what seem to be broad grants of power-such as the power of gen-
eral legislation in the District of Columbia-must be seen as carry-
ing inherent limitations. After all, the individuals ratifying the 
Constitution could hardly have believed that they were giving the 
new government power to reenact such ancient practices as burning 
religious dissenters at the stake, even within the seat of government. 
Conservatives, on the other hand, point to what they see as the lack 
of textual support for modern judicial decisions. They also argue 
that whatever limits the Framers may have meant to impose on the 
federal government implicitly, they imposed only a few very specific 
limitations on the states. 
In response, some scholars have suggested that constitutional 
law has resulted from a creative interplay of history, text, and 
evolving social norms. Ultimately, practical reason mediates be-
tween the anchoring tendencies of text and history, and the dy-
namic pull of the legal system's aspiration toward justice. 
In the meantime, some critical legal scholars argue that the 
language and history of the Constitution have little to do with the 
outcomes of cases. As one critical legal scholar has argued: 
Perhaps more than any area of the law, constitutional law reveals 
the indeterminacy of liberal legal thought. While purporting 
merely to rely on the rules laid down in the Constitution, the 
open texture of Constitutional language has given the Court free 
rein to create doctrinal results inspired more by ideology than by 
history or text. The plasticity of the legal materials allows them 
to be molded toward any politically desired goal. 
On the other hand, Morris Zapp, a prominent literary theorist, ar-
gues that the critical scholars are right about the indeterminacy of 
texts but wrong about the implications: 
A text means nothing without a reader. It means different things 
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to different readers. So far, the Crits are right. But no reader 
simply decides what the text means. Consider the broad protec-
tion of individual rights, which generations of judges have found 
in the Privileges and Immunities Clause and the Bill of Attainder 
Clause. Other readers, in other contexts, might have read these 
as no more than technicalities. Our judges, from almost the be-
ginning, read them as foundations of individual liberty. But this 
does not mean that they decided how to read these clauses, as if 
they had a menu of interpretations to choose from. They had to 
read those clauses from their own standpoint, from the stand-
point of American lawyers, trained in a certain commonlaw tra-
dition in which the line between technicalities and fundamentals 
has never been clear to begin with. They read the Constitution to 
embody a concept of limited government and individual freedom. 
How else could they have read it, being who they were? What 
choice did they have? What other interpretation could they have 
found? There was never any moment when they were free to 
choose. 
• • • • • • • • • • • • 
ROE V. WADE 
410 u.s. 113 (1973) 
[The issue before the Court was the constitutionality of the Texas 
abortion law, which prohibited all abortions except those performed 
to save the life of the mother.] 
JUSTICE BLACKMUN delivered the opinion of the Court. 
• • • 
The Constitution does not explicitly mention any right of pri-
vacy. But the Court bas recognized that a right of personal privacy, 
or a guarantee of certain areas or zones of privacy, does exist under 
the Constitution. In varying contexts, the Court or individual Jus-
tices have, indeed, found at least the roots of that right in the jury 
trial clause and its implied prohibition of unreasonable searches, 
Stanley v. Georgia; in the Preamble's language concerning the Bless-
ings of Liberty; in the concept of liberty guaranteed by the privi-
leges and immunities clause of article IV, Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 
U.S. 390 (1923); in the special protection granted by the contract 
clause to consensual relationships such as marriage, Loving v. Vir-
ginia; in the bill of attainder clause, Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 
535 (1942); and in the penumbras of all these clauses, Griswold v. 
Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965). These decisions make it clear 
that only personal rights that can be deemed "fundamental" or "im-
plicit in the concept of ordered liberty" [Palko] are included in the 
guarantee of personal privacy. They also make it clear that the 
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right has some extension to activities relating to marriage, procrea-
tion, contraception, family relationships, and child rearing and 
education. 
This right of privacy, whether it be found in the Privilege and 
Immunity Clause's concept of personal liberty, as we feel it is, or as 
the District Court determined, in the Preamble, is broad enough to 
encompass a woman's decision whether or not to terminate her 
pregnancy. * * * 
* * * * * * * * * * * * 
"The Past is Prologue." 
